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REGIONAL INSIGHT
05 OCTOBER 2026
OPEN-SOURCE ASSESSMENT

MEKELLE	AFAR	AMHARA	ERITREA
Federal/allied control re-established; TPLF leadership and regional administration withdrew.	Abala and Erebti reportedly retaken; immediate pressure on the A1/Djibouti corridor reduced.	Federal gains at Alamata and Sekota; southern and western fronts remain strategically relevant.	Diplomatic ties severed; direct current military involvement remains unproven in open sources.

OPTARUS REGIONAL INSIGHT

Tigray After Mekelle

How battlefield reversal is reshaping risk across Afar, Amhara, Eritrea and the Djibouti corridor

05 October 2026 | Collection cut-off: 13:20 BST

KEY JUDGEMENT

The recapture of Mekelle and its airport by Ethiopian federal and allied forces is a major reversal for the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), but it should not be read as the end of the northern war. The TPLF has explicitly framed its withdrawal as temporary and has preserved both its political intent and at least part of its armed structure. Optarus assesses that the conflict is now more likely to shift from a contest for the regional capital toward a fragmented struggle across Tigray's southern, western, eastern and border approaches. That shift would reduce the symbolic importance of city control while increasing the operational importance of roads, secondary towns, border zones and humanitarian access. The immediate threat to Ethiopia's Djibouti trade lifeline has eased after federal and allied forces reversed rebel gains in Afar around Abala and Erebti; no disruption to the A1 corridor is confirmed. Humanitarian effects are already material: hospitals have received hundreds of war-wounded, outreach and some medical activity have been suspended, civilian flights remain halted, communications have been disrupted, and negotiated evacuations have been required. If Mekelle stabilises, access could improve selectively; if fighting disperses, humanitarian needs may become harder rather than easier to reach.

4 OCT	>420	>300	>95%
MEKELLE RETAKEN	KOREM + ALAMATA WAR-WOUNDED	SUHUL / SHIRE WAR-WOUNDED	ETHIOPIA TRADE VIA DJIBOUTI
Reuters / AP	MSF, 22-25 Sep	MSF, by 25 Sep	World Bank

ASSESSMENT CONFIDENCE: HIGH on the Mekelle control shift and current access disruption; MODERATE on the likely move toward dispersed peripheral fighting; LOW-MODERATE on direct external-state military involvement.

Executive Assessment




Figure 1. Geographic reference: key Tigray-Afar nodes and the Djibouti transmission pathway. Analytical support image for reader orientation; generalised for briefing use, not for navigation.

What changed since Northern Ethiopia Reopens

The previous Optarus assessment identified Afar as the principal transmission geography between renewed Tigray conflict and systems that matter to Ethiopia and Djibouti. That judgement remains valid, but the military picture has changed materially. Federal and allied forces have reversed much of the late-September opposition advance, retaken Alamata, Abala and Erebti, recaptured Mekelle airport and entered Mekelle after the TPLF withdrew. [1][2][3]

The critical analytical change is therefore not that regional risk has disappeared. It is that the conflict's centre of gravity has shifted. Mekelle is again under federal/allied control, while the TPLF says its regional administration will operate elsewhere and its forces will continue fighting. [1][2] This raises the probability of a more dispersed campaign in which peripheral roads, secondary towns, border areas and supply routes matter more than possession of the capital alone.

Evidence status

ISSUE	STATUS	CURRENT JUDGEMENT
Mekelle under federal/allied control	CONFIRMED	Reuters, AP and resident/humanitarian-source reporting converge. [1][2]
Mekelle airport retaken	CONFIRMED	Reuters/AP report federal control; civilian service has not been confirmed resumed. [3][14]
Abala and Erebti retaken	CORROBORATED	Specialist conflict tracking reports the federal/allied counteroffensive reversed the Afar advance. [4]
A1 / Addis-Djibouti corridor disrupted	NOT ESTABLISHED	No reliable evidence identified of physical corridor disruption at cut-off. [4][12]
TPLF operational collapse	NOT ESTABLISHED	The TPLF describes the Mekelle withdrawal as temporary and says it will continue fighting. [1][2]
Direct Eritrean military support to TPLF	UNPROVEN	Ethiopia alleges external support; Eritrea denies it. Diplomatic ties have been severed. [9][10]
Humanitarian deterioration	CONFIRMED	Medical caseloads, suspended activities, flight stoppages, communications disruption and access concerns are documented. [6][7][8][13]

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT

How does the loss of Mekelle change the military trajectory of the Tigray conflict, and through which routes is that change most likely to transmit humanitarian, commercial and regional-security effects into Afar, Amhara, Eritrea, Djibouti and the wider Horn?

Military Operating Picture

1. Mekelle and central Tigray - control without closure

Federal troops and the pro-government Tigray Peace Forces (TPF) entered Mekelle after the TPLF withdrew. The TPLF stated that the regional administration would temporarily relocate and continue operating elsewhere. [1][2] The federal side is simultaneously signalling a plan to establish a new interim administration and move toward regional elections; this comes from Ethiopian state media and should be treated as the federal government's declared political intent rather than a settled governance outcome. [11]

Optarus assessment: Mekelle is an important political, administrative and logistics centre, but control of the city does not by itself eliminate the TPLF's ability to continue a dispersed conflict. The immediate transition remains uneven. AP reported looting during the withdrawal; by 5 October, ground reporting indicated federal and Tigray Peace Force personnel were patrolling key institutions and mobile/internet service had partially returned in Mekelle, while many shops remained closed and residents still reported gaps in policing. This is early node-level stabilisation, not yet evidence of normal administration or region-wide recovery. [2][19]

2. Southern axis - Alamata, Korem, Maychew and the A2

Federal and allied forces retook Alamata on 28 September after heavy fighting; specialist reporting subsequently tracked federal advances north through the southern approach to Mekelle. [5][4] Alamata matters because it sits on the principal north-south road axis and serves as a supply and service node for southern Tigray and the Amhara approaches. The area has also produced some of the clearest humanitarian evidence of the new war: Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) recorded more than 420 war-wounded at Korem and Alamata hospitals between 22 and 25 September and suspended its activities at Alamata Hospital because of insecurity. [6]

Optarus assessment: federal control of the A2 approach improves Addis Ababa's ability to sustain forces and reconnect central Tigray, but it also places communities and service infrastructure along the southern axis inside a high-tempo military logistics corridor. Even if front lines move north, medical referrals, market access and aid movement can remain constrained by checkpoints, damaged infrastructure, insecurity and prioritisation of military traffic.

3. Eastern axis - Afar has moved from breakthrough risk to residual pressure

Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) and allied Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF/Ugugumo) forces captured Abala and Erebti during the initial offensive, creating concern because the secondary road eastward connects toward Semera and the A1 Ethiopia-Djibouti corridor. Federal and allied forces reportedly retook both towns on 1 October, largely reversing the advance. [4] Reports of rebel control in Dallol and other northern Afar districts remain less certain and should not be treated as a fixed front line. [4]

Optarus assessment: the immediate probability of a rebel thrust toward the A1 corridor has fallen, but Afar remains the most important transmission zone between the Tigray war and Ethiopia's national trade system. The risk has changed from imminent corridor encroachment to recurrent pressure: renewed probes, troop concentrations, local displacement and security measures can still raise transport friction without physically severing the highway.

4. Western and northern axes - the least transparent, potentially most escalatory

Fighting has been reported around the Tekeze/Wolkayt front, while Shire, Axum and Adigrat remain important northern population, aviation and humanitarian nodes. Partial connectivity has returned in parts of Mekelle, but communications remain uneven across Tigray and territorial control beyond the capital is still difficult to verify independently. Claims about secondary towns and border districts therefore remain time-bounded and require corroboration. [5][13][19]

The northern axis also touches the Ethiopia-Eritrea relationship. Ethiopia and Eritrea severed diplomatic ties on 1 October after Addis Ababa accused Eritrea of supporting the opposition; Eritrea denied the allegation and counter-accused Ethiopia of hostile intent. [9][10] Optarus has not identified independently verified evidence at cut-off that establishes current direct Eritrean military participation in the fighting.

Regional Transmission

Afar and the Djibouti corridor

The Addis-Djibouti corridor carries more than 95 percent of Ethiopia's import-export trade by volume. [12] The significance of Afar is therefore not only territorial. It is the region through which a local military advance can begin to affect fuel availability, trucking confidence, transport costs and national economic continuity.

At the current cut-off there is no reliable evidence of disruption to the A1 trade corridor itself. The federal recapture of Abala and Erebti reduces the immediate threat. That does not remove secondary effects. Security deployments, road checks, military traffic, displaced populations and uncertainty can raise costs and slow movement before a corridor becomes physically impassable.

> **CURRENT CORRIDOR JUDGEMENT**
>
> NO CONFIRMED STRATEGIC CORRIDOR DISRUPTION. The most decision-relevant change would be verified fighting or repeated security incidents moving toward Semera, Mille or the A1; sustained freight or fuel delays; rail disruption; or official restrictions affecting commercial transit.

Amhara - a military flank and a humanitarian pressure neighbour

The renewed war has crossed the Tigray-Amhara boundary around North Wello, Wag Hemra and disputed western areas. Federal gains at Sekota and Alamata have blocked the immediate formation of a stronger continuous opposition axis, but they do not resolve the underlying territorial disputes or the separate Fano insurgency against the federal government. [5]

Humanitarian relevance follows directly from this fragmented geography. Conflict on both sides of the regional boundary complicates referral routes, market access and population movement. Host communities in Amhara are already dealing with their own insecurity and displacement burdens, limiting the amount of spare capacity available to absorb new movement from Tigray.

Eritrea - highest-impact external escalation pathway

The diplomatic rupture between Ethiopia and Eritrea materially raises the consequence of any military incident along the northern border. Eritrea was a major combatant in the 2020-22 war, but the current alignment is different and the public claims are contradictory. Ethiopia alleges Eritrean support to the TPLF-led opposition; Eritrea denies this and accuses Ethiopia of pursuing hostile ambitions over Red Sea access. [9][10]

Optarus assessment: the strongest current signal is political and diplomatic, not proof of direct battlefield intervention. A verified cross-border deployment, artillery exchange, air strike, or sustained logistical support would move the assessment sharply upward. The October 4 Egypt-Sudan-Eritrea-Somalia summit adds to the perception of regional political clustering, but its public declaration is not evidence of a military coalition against Ethiopia. The African Union also clarified on 4 October that its earlier de-escalation statement was not intended to attribute responsibility for current developments to any neighbouring state. [15][21]

Sudan and the western outlet

Western Tigray traditionally links toward Sudan, but Sudan's own war makes it a poor pressure-release valve for either humanitarian movement or commercial substitution. Any significant westward displacement would therefore enter an already unstable border environment. Optarus treats this as a prospective exposure pathway rather than a currently verified cross-border displacement trend.

Humanitarian Knock-on Effects

Medical capacity is already absorbing the first shock

MSF reported that war-wounded caseloads at Korem and Alamata hospitals rose from around 180 in a 48-hour period to more than 420 between 22 and 25 September. More than 300 war-wounded patients had also reached Suhul Hospital in Shire by 25 September. MSF suspended activities at Alamata Hospital and outreach work because of insecurity, while continuing support in Shire, Sheraro and Korem. [6]

This is important analytically because it shows that humanitarian pressure is not only a future displacement problem. It is already affecting the operating model of healthcare delivery: staff are being redirected, outreach is contracting and hospitals are absorbing trauma caseloads while still responsible for maternal, child and routine services.

Air access remains a critical constraint

The TPLF seizure of Mekelle, Axum and Shire airports on 23 September forced suspension of civilian flights. Federal forces have since retaken Mekelle airport, but the 5 October refresh identified no reliable confirmation that scheduled passenger services to Mekelle, Axum or Shire had resumed by the cut-off. [3][14]

Optarus assessment: control of an airport and usability of an airport are different variables. Humanitarian and civilian benefit depends on security clearance, airfield condition, air traffic control, airline confidence and the broader security environment. Continued closure would keep staff rotations, urgent referrals and high-value light cargo dependent on road movement.

Communications, cash and markets are operational enablers

Communications have been heavily disrupted across Tigray, and reporting from Mekelle during the federal advance described closed banks and shops, cash shortages and uncertainty. By 4-5 October, phone and internet service had partially returned in parts of Mekelle, but restoration was incomplete and businesses remained disrupted. [2][19] Communications loss is not only an information problem: it degrades beneficiary registration, cash transfers, staff tracking, procurement, market coordination and independent verification.

Partial restoration in Mekelle is now observable, but Optarus has not identified evidence that normal connectivity, banking, market function or public security have been restored region-wide. The distinction matters: improvement in the capital can coexist with continued operational isolation elsewhere in Tigray. [19]

Displacement risk is moving with the fronts

A local humanitarian source cited by AP estimated roughly 150,000 people displaced in Afar during the first phase of the renewed fighting; this remains an early attributed estimate, not a UN-verified current total. [16] The UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator reported on 30 September that new displacement was emerging across the northern crisis, but no consolidated post-1 October total had been published by the updated cut-off. [20] More broadly, Tigray, Amhara and Afar entered the current crisis with large unresolved displacement and return caseloads from previous conflicts. [17]

The humanitarian significance of a more fragmented war is that displacement may become multi-directional rather than concentrated. Movement can occur away from individual fronts into towns and host communities that are themselves exposed to insecurity, drought, damaged services or previous displacement. This raises the risk of smaller, harder-to-track caseloads rather than one clearly defined mass movement.

Humanitarian access and neutrality

The United Nations, African Union (AU), European Union and humanitarian agencies have all called for safe and unhindered access. The EU has specifically condemned strikes affecting humanitarian convoys and denial of humanitarian access. [7][8][18] The UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator also reported incidents affecting aid personnel, assets and premises, noting that at least 10 humanitarian vehicles had been seized by armed groups during 2025-26 and only two recovered by 30 September. [20] The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) evacuation of 161 people from Mekelle to Semera demonstrates that negotiated road movement remained possible in at least one controlled operation, but it should not be interpreted as evidence of routine access. [7]

> **HUMANITARIAN BOUNDARY**
>
> This assessment treats displaced civilians as affected populations, not as security threats. The relevant security variable is the operating environment around routes, services, staff movements, reception capacity and civilian infrastructure.

Second- and Third-Order Effects

TRANSMISSION MECHANISM	WHAT CHANGES	WHY IT MATTERS
Governance transition in Mekelle	Competing claims of authority, new interim structures, security handover and administrative uncertainty.	Permits, counterpart legitimacy, local procurement, staff safety and aid coordination may become temporarily less predictable.
Afar security reinforcement	Federal attention remains focused on preventing renewed eastern advances.	Military traffic and security measures may increase friction on secondary roads and around Semera even without A1 closure.
Amhara-Tigray interface	Unresolved territorial disputes intersect with the separate Fano conflict.	Aid and commerce face a patchwork of armed actors, checkpoints and changing local control.
Eritrea rupture	Diplomatic channels have collapsed while mutual accusations are intensifying.	Higher risk of miscalculation, border incidents and externalisation of the war; also complicates refugee/consular contingencies.
Aviation isolation	Tigray civilian flights remain suspended.	Longer staff rotations, constrained medical referral, greater dependence on roads and reduced business continuity.
Communications disruption	Network interruptions reduce visibility and transaction capacity.	Slower verification, payments, market activity, incident reporting and family tracing.
Djibouti corridor protection	The national trade artery remains open but strategically exposed to Afar instability.	Even non-closure effects could appear as cost, delay, insurance and fuel-distribution pressure.

Commercial and institutional exposure

- Humanitarian organisations: access, medical referrals, staff rotation, telecommunications, permissions, local procurement and duty-of-care exposure.
- Ethiopian importers and freight operators: Afar security, fuel distribution, road delays and any change in the Addis-Djibouti corridor operating picture.
- Aviation and travel: suspended Tigray flights, short-notice closures elsewhere in northern Ethiopia and constrained evacuation options.
- Foreign missions and development organisations: political access, staff safety, programme continuity and the risk of wider Ethiopia-Eritrea escalation.
- Djibouti-linked logistics actors: not currently facing Tigray-caused port disruption, but exposed to any future deterioration around Semera/Mille/A1.
- Health and protection actors: trauma caseloads, reduced outreach, pressure on host communities and possible renewed gender-based violence and protection needs.

Competing Hypotheses

HYPOTHESIS	CURRENT WEIGHT	DESCRIPTION	WHAT WOULD SUPPORT IT
H1 - Federal consolidation, dispersed TPLF resistance	**MOST LIKELY / MODERATE-HIGH**	Federal/allied forces hold Mekelle and main southern/eastern approaches; TPLF shifts to peripheral fronts, rural terrain, western/northern axes and alliance-based pressure.	Mekelle administration stabilises; A2 remains open; fighting persists outside the capital; no large opposition thrust toward Semera/A1.
H2 - Renewed multi-front opposition counteroffensive	**PLAUSIBLE / MODERATE**	TPLF and allied groups re-open Afar and Amhara fronts, exploit federal overextension and use long-range/drone capability to widen pressure beyond Tigray.	Fresh gains at Abala/Erebti/Afdera axis; coordinated attacks in Amhara; repeat verified strikes on federal military infrastructure.
H3 - Ethiopia-Eritrea direct escalation	**LOWER PROBABILITY / HIGH IMPACT**	Border tensions move from diplomatic rupture and proxy accusations to direct cross-border military action.	Verified troop concentrations, cross-border fire, air strikes, formal mobilisation or independently confirmed material support.
H4 - Negotiated freeze / AU-mediated de-escalation	**LOW-MODERATE**	Military exhaustion, humanitarian pressure and external diplomacy produce a pause tied to renewed Pretoria-process talks.	Ceasefire language from both signatories; reopening of civilian flights; restoration of communications; AU engagement accepted by both sides.

Indicators & Warnings - what to monitor next

MILITARY

- Mekelle remains under stable federal/allied control or becomes contested again.
- ENDF/TPF advance toward Axum, Shire, Adigrat or western Tigray.
- Renewed TDF/ARDUF movement toward Abala, Erebti, Afdera, Semera or the A1 corridor.
- Confirmed drone or long-range strikes outside the immediate northern theatre.

HUMANITARIAN

- Resumption or continued suspension of civilian flights to Mekelle, Axum and Shire.
- Restoration of telecommunications, banking, fuel distribution and markets.
- Humanitarian convoy access, staff movement and any further strikes or interdiction.
- Verified new displacement totals and pressure on hospitals, host communities and shelters.

REGIONAL

- Any verified Eritrean cross-border military activity or material support.
- Ethiopia-Eritrea diplomatic/military signalling around Assab and the border.
- Freight delays, fuel constraints or security restrictions on the Addis-Djibouti corridor.
- AU mediation gaining or losing access to the principal parties.

Outlook & Bottom Line

Near term (days): federal/allied control of Mekelle is already being followed by partial communications restoration and a declared federal plan to establish a new interim administration and move toward regional elections. [11][19] The greatest uncertainty is where the TPLF has concentrated forces and political leadership after withdrawal, and whether governance structures can stabilise without widening coercion or resistance. Humanitarian access may improve inside Mekelle before it improves across the region as a whole.

Short term (1-3 weeks): the most likely pattern is fragmented fighting rather than a clean end to the war. Southern and eastern federal gains reduce immediate pressure on the Djibouti corridor, but western/northern Tigray and the Eritrea border may become more important. The humanitarian system will be vulnerable to geography: if fronts disperse, smaller communities and secondary facilities may become harder to reach even as the capital stabilises.

Regional risk: direct Ethiopia-Eritrea escalation remains less likely than continued hostile signalling, diplomatic clustering and proxy accusations, but its impact would be severe. The diplomatic rupture removes a buffer against miscalculation. The African Union's 4 October clarification reinforces the need to distinguish political alignment and accusation from verified military involvement. Any independently corroborated cross-border military activity would materially change the assessment. [21]

BOTTOM LINE

Mekelle has changed hands, but the regional risk has not closed. The military reversal has reduced the immediate danger of a rebel approach toward Ethiopia's Djibouti trade artery while increasing the likelihood that the conflict disperses into peripheral fronts and contested governance. For humanitarian actors, the key question is no longer simply whether access to Mekelle is possible; it is whether roads, communications, health systems and local administration can function consistently across a wider and more fragmented conflict geography.

Collection Gaps

- Current location and command structure of the TPLF regional administration and main field formations after withdrawal from Mekelle.
- Reliable, current control status for Axum, Shire, Adigrat, Dallol and western Tigray localities.
- Verified post-1 October displacement totals across Tigray, Afar and Amhara.
- Civilian operability and restart timelines for Mekelle, Axum and Shire airports.
- Current freight, fuel and rail performance on the Addis-Djibouti corridor, including any security-related delays.
- Independent evidence confirming or disproving external material support to the TPLF-led alliance.

Methodology & Editorial Safeguards

This assessment uses an analyst-directed deep-source collection pass prioritising official and humanitarian sources, then local/regional reporting, specialist conflict analysis and major international reporting for corroboration. The evidence picture was refreshed through 13:20 BST on 5 October 2026. Military control claims are treated as time-bounded and are not presented as permanent front lines. Allegations of foreign support are attributed and separated from verified evidence. Humanitarian effects are assessed through access, health, transport, communications and service capacity; displaced people are not treated as security threats. Final publication scan: Optarus INTEL Desk inputs and Ethiopian/regional reporting were rechecked at the stated cut-off; no development was identified that materially changed the core judgement.

Legal/editorial review: no personal data beyond public officials; no operational targeting guidance; no claim of sanctions exposure; no implication that refugees or internally displaced people constitute a security risk; current and historical facts are separated; contested claims are attributed. This assessment is not intended for navigational, tactical or targeting use.

AI transparency: Optarus uses analyst-directed AI tools to support source retrieval, comparison, drafting and quality control. Analytical judgements, attribution decisions and publication thresholds are reviewed against cited open sources before release. AI assistance does not replace source verification or analyst accountability.

Source Appendix

[1] Reuters, 4 Oct 2026 - Mekelle recaptured by federal/allied forces; TPLF withdrawal and temporary relocation of regional administration. Reuters | [2] Associated Press, 4-5 Oct 2026 - Entry of government/allied forces into Mekelle; looting, communications disruption and transition conditions. AP | [3] Reuters / AP, 3-4 Oct 2026 - Federal recapture of Alula Aba Nega Airport; civilian service not confirmed resumed. Reuters/AP

[4] Critical Threats Project, 2 Oct 2026 - Afar counteroffensive, Abala/Erebti and southern/eastern conflict axes. CTP | [5] ACLED / Reuters / Al Jazeera, late Sep-4 Oct 2026 - Conflict geography across Tigray, Amhara and Afar; control and communications indicators. ACLED | [6] Médecins Sans Frontières, 28 Sep 2026 - War-wounded surge at Korem/Alamata and reduced medical activity. MSF

[7] International Committee of the Red Cross, 29 Sep 2026 - Evacuation of 161 people from Mekelle to Semera. ICRC | [8] UNICEF, 1 Oct 2026 - Civilian/child impact and call for unimpeded humanitarian access. UNICEF | [9] Reuters / Ethiopian statements, 1-4 Oct 2026 - Ethiopia-Eritrea diplomatic rupture and allegations of external support. Reuters

[10] Eritrea Ministry of Information, 1 Oct 2026 - Eritrean denial of Ethiopian accusations and severance of diplomatic ties. Shabait | [11] Ethiopian News Agency, 4 Oct 2026 - Federal-side proposal for a new Tigray interim administration and regional elections. ENA | [12] World Bank, 20 Jul 2023 - More than 95% of Ethiopia import-export trade by volume uses the Addis-Djibouti corridor. World Bank

[13] Ethiopian Human Rights Commission / Amnesty International, 25 Sep-2 Oct 2026 - Civilian infrastructure, movement and rights impacts; fighting across Tigray/Afar/Amhara. EHRC/Amnesty | [14] UK FCDO Ethiopia travel advice, updated 1 Oct 2026 - Civilian flights to/from Tigray suspended and wider northern aviation disruption. UK FCDO | [15] Addis Standard / Eritrea Ministry of Information, 4-5 Oct 2026 - Egypt-Sudan-Eritrea-Somalia summit and El Alamein declaration; political coordination only. allafrica.com / Shabait

[16] Associated Press / local humanitarian source, late Sep 2026 - Early estimate of roughly 150,000 displaced in Afar; not treated as a current UN-verified total. AP | [17] IOM / UNHCR Ethiopia displacement datasets, 2026 - Pre-existing displacement and return caseloads across northern Ethiopia. IOM/UNHCR | [18] European External Action Service, 23 Sep 2026 - Condemnation of attacks affecting humanitarian operations and access. EEAS

[19] BBC Tigrinya / AFP reporting, 4-5 Oct 2026 - Partial communications restoration, federal/allied patrols, closed businesses and policing gaps in Mekelle. BBC Tigrinya/AFP | [20] UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Ethiopia, 30 Sep 2026 - New displacement, incidents affecting aid personnel/assets/premises and seizure of humanitarian vehicles. UN Ethiopia | [21] African Union Commission, 4 Oct 2026 - Clarification that its de-escalation statement did not attribute responsibility to neighbouring states. AU

Acronyms & Terms

TERM	PLAIN-ENGLISH DEFINITION
A1	Primary Ethiopia-Djibouti highway / trade-corridor road axis.
A2	Main north-south road axis linking Amhara and Tigray through Alamata/Maychew toward Mekelle.
AU	African Union.
CoHA	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, signed in Pretoria in November 2022.
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defence Force.
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross.
IDP	Internally displaced person.
IHL	International humanitarian law.
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières / Doctors Without Borders.
TDF	Tigray Defence Forces; armed wing aligned with the TPLF.
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front.
TPF	Tigray Peace Forces; pro-federal Tigrayan armed formation referenced in current reporting.
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene services.

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