GEOGRAPHY	DEFENCE	ALLIES	TRAJECTORY
Riyadh, both coasts, Eastern Region and the southern border are now inside the active/recent threat picture.	Interception remains effective at priority nodes, but detection is not the same as equal engagement coverage.	UK and Pakistan add real capacity; Turkish and Egyptian contributions remain partly prospective or politically bounded.	More layered point defence plus greater ISR/counterforce is more likely than any single-system solution.

OPTARUS REGIONAL INSIGHT

Saudi Arabia's Air-Defence Problem Is Becoming a Geography Problem

Why expanding Houthi strike geography is testing point defence, interceptor depth and the launch cycle

22 October 2026 | Collection cut-off: 10:46 BST

KEY JUDGEMENT

Saudi Arabia's layered air and missile defence remains capable of defeating many Houthi missiles and drones, particularly around priority assets, but the campaign is changing from a problem of interception effectiveness into a problem of defensive scalability. September-October attacks and attempted attacks have reached or affected Riyadh and its airport, the Eastern Region and Dhahran/Dammam, western energy and aviation nodes, and the southern border. Optarus assesses with MODERATE-HIGH confidence that, if this geographic distribution persists, Saudi Arabia will increasingly have to prioritise defended assets rather than provide equivalent point-defence depth everywhere. Allied support can add sensors, fighters, personnel and defensive capacity, especially against UAVs and other air-breathing threats, but it does not remove the underlying geography or high-end interceptor-magazine constraint. The likely strategic trajectory is therefore a combination of deeper layered defence, lower-cost counter-UAS, tighter sensor/C2 integration and greater emphasis on persistent ISR and counterforce intended to reduce the number of weapons reaching the engagement phase. Counterforce can suppress launch tempo and destroy scarce systems; historical evidence does not support treating it as a complete or durable solution on its own.

730	~$4.6m	1	7
PAC-3 MSE REQUESTED	**FY26 PAC-3 MSE COST**	**ACTIVE SAUDI THAAD BATTERY**	**UAVS INTERCEPTED 21 OCT**
Saudi proposed FMS, Jan 2026 [13]	US Army gross weapon-system unit cost [14]	Manufacturer-reported current status [17]	Madinah / Eastern / southern regions [5]

ASSESSMENT CONFIDENCE: MODERATE-HIGH on geographic-saturation trajectory; HIGH on widening threat geography; MODERATE on magazine/economic pressure; LOW-MODERATE on the scale and timing of additional allied deployments.

Executive Assessment

THE FORWARD EDGE

WHAT OTHERS ALREADY KNOW
Saudi Arabia is facing repeated Houthi missile and drone attacks, has intercepted many incoming threats and is receiving additional allied defensive support.

WHAT OPTARUS ADDS
The consequential change is the distribution of the target set. A defender can succeed tactically at individual engagements while losing efficiency strategically if the attacker forces more cities, airports, energy nodes and logistics systems to require protection at the same time. The relevant question is therefore not simply whether Patriot, THAAD or fighters can intercept a threat; it is how long high-quality coverage, magazines, crews and readiness can be spread across an expanding geography without creating prioritisation and residual exposure elsewhere.

Threat Geography - the problem is spreading faster than a single defended-area model





Figure 1. Verified affected/threatened areas and selected infrastructure nodes. Base geography is Natural Earth; overlays are derived from SPA/GACA, EASA and Reuters reporting. No Saudi air-defence battery locations or Houthi launch coordinates are shown.

EASA's current Saudi Arabia Conflict Zone Information Bulletin is the clearest independent validation of the change. It states that September attacks increased significantly in both frequency and geographic scope and identifies deeper exposure around Riyadh, Tabuk, Medina and Yanbu, while noting repeated attacks on the Riyadh area including its airport. It also links the wider attack pattern to missile/drone overflight, air-defence activation, interception activity, falling debris and misidentification risk for civil aviation. [1]

October has reinforced rather than reversed that assessment. Saudi authorities have reported repeated ballistic, cruise-missile and UAV interceptions around Riyadh; direct attacks on King Khalid International Airport; an attack on King Fahd International Airport near Dammam; an attack on Aramco's headquarters in Dhahran; a projectile impact in Najran; repeated Khamis Mushait interceptions; and UAV activity across the Eastern, Madinah and southern regions. [2-12] The pattern does not prove every site faces the same probability of attack. It does show that the set of locations requiring credible contingency planning is materially wider than a southern-border defence problem.

The Defender's Dilemma



Houthi forces do not need to overwhelm every Saudi battery to create strategic effect. Distributed attacks can impose cost by forcing the defender to protect more places, retain more ready interceptors, maintain fighter patrols, move or duplicate support systems, increase crew and maintenance demand, and accept different levels of protection across the country. This burden exists even when the incoming weapon is destroyed.

The 13 October Riyadh case is a useful demonstration. Saudi authorities reported that two cruise missiles were intercepted and destroyed, yet falling debris injured four people and damaged 15 homes. A separate ballistic-missile interception the following day injured another resident and caused limited property damage. [2] Interception therefore cannot be equated with zero consequence. For aviation, urban operations, insurers and employers, the residual effects of a successful defence can still include closure, diversion, emergency response, debris damage, disruption and duty-of-care escalation.

National surveillance is not national point-defence coverage

A national air picture can detect and track threats across a wide area; it does not follow that every asset beneath that picture can receive equivalent engagement coverage. Point-defence systems have finite defended footprints, interceptor inventories, reload and maintenance cycles, crews and support demands. High-end systems will therefore be concentrated around assets judged most consequential. Shorter-range systems, fighters, electronic warfare and counter-UAS measures can relieve pressure against some threat classes, but they are not interchangeable with dedicated ballistic-missile defence.

That distinction becomes more important as the target mix widens. Riyadh's political and aviation infrastructure, Eastern Province energy and industrial nodes, Yanbu and Red Sea export infrastructure, civil airports, military facilities and southern population centres cannot all be treated as if they were one defended point. Geography converts an inventory question into an allocation question.

Interceptor economics - cost matters, but the protected asset matters more

The economic exchange is often simplified into a comparison between the cost of a drone and the cost of a Patriot interceptor. That framing is incomplete. The relevant calculation is attacker cost versus defender engagement cost versus the value and consequence of the asset being protected. Spending millions of dollars to prevent a strike on a major airport, refinery, command facility or populated area can be entirely rational. The strategic problem emerges when a comparatively cheaper attack architecture can repeatedly choose where the defender must spend high-end readiness and interceptors.

US Army FY2026 budget material lists a gross weapon-system unit cost of about US$4.6 million for PAC-3 MSE. This is an illustrative US Army procurement figure, not a Saudi engagement cost and not evidence that every Houthi weapon requires PAC-3 MSE or that one interceptor is fired per threat. [14] Saudi Arabia's January 2026 request for 730 PAC-3 MSE missiles in a proposed US$9 billion FMS package nevertheless shows the scale at which magazine depth is being addressed. [13] The US Army and Lockheed Martin are also accelerating PAC-3 MSE production, with a framework intended to raise annual production capacity from roughly 600 to 2,000 over seven years. [15][16] That industrial response is itself evidence that interceptor availability is a strategic constraint across multiple users, even though no public evidence shows Saudi Arabia is currently exhausting its stockpile.

Layered Defence - useful layers, different jobs

Saudi defence should not be reduced to Patriot. The Kingdom's defensive architecture combines national warning and radar, Patriot, emerging THAAD capacity, shorter-range air defence and counter-UAS systems, electronic warfare, fighter aircraft, command-and-control, and allied support. Public manufacturer reporting lists one active Saudi THAAD battery while the Missile Defense Agency says THAAD interceptor delivery to the Kingdom began in 2025. [17] The distinction between layers is central to understanding what reinforcement can and cannot solve.

LAYER	BEST CONTRIBUTION	BOUNDARY / LIMIT
Patriot / PAC-3	High-value point and area defence against tactical ballistic missiles and selected cruise/air-breathing threats.	High-end magazine and defended-footprint constraints; cannot be treated as ubiquitous national cover.
THAAD	Upper-tier ballistic missile defence and additional layered depth for selected strategic areas.	Not a counter-UAS substitute; current Saudi fielded depth remains limited publicly.
Short-range / counter-UAS	More economical defence against drones and short-range air-breathing threats; useful for local asset protection.	Range, sensor and engagement-envelope limits; cannot replace BMD.
Fighter aircraft	Flexible patrol, sensing and interception against drones, aircraft and some cruise-missile profiles.	Do not replace dedicated ground-based ballistic-missile defence; persistence and tanker/support demands matter.
Electronic warfare	Can disrupt some UAV navigation/control and reduce kinetic-interceptor demand.	Effect varies by system and autonomy; not universal against ballistic/cruise threats.
Sensors / C2 / ISR	Extends warning, supports classification, cueing, prioritisation and counterforce.	Awareness does not create unlimited interceptors or simultaneous engagement capacity.

Allied reinforcement - capacity addition, not geographic escape

The UK is now a confirmed operational contributor. On 20 October the Ministry of Defence announced RAF Typhoon defensive counter-air missions to protect Saudi cities and critical national infrastructure, an A400M for movement of defence materiel, military advisers and extended refuelling support, building on existing UK air-defence equipment and personnel. The Typhoon contribution is meaningful: fighter aircraft can remove some UAV and air-breathing threats from the engagement burden and provide flexible sensing/interception. It does not substitute for ground-based ballistic-missile defence. [18]

Pakistan has moved beyond political signalling: its military confirmed forces in Saudi Arabia serving in multiple capabilities and domains under the Makkah pact, although public reporting does not establish force size, precise basing, detailed systems or rules of engagement. [20] Turkey is further behind in the deployment cycle. Ankara submitted the pact for parliamentary ratification and has described an initial contribution centred on equipment, intelligence, weapons systems and prospective technical personnel for air defence and electronic warfare; a separate parliamentary mandate would be needed for troop deployment. [21] Egypt's president has stated that any Egyptian military support would be limited to defending Saudi territory and borders, while parliament has yet to complete the relevant authorisation process. [22] These distinctions matter: allies can increase capacity and share burden, but announced solidarity is not the same as an additional ballistic-missile engagement magazine already on the ground.

Right of Launch vs Left of Launch

THE NEXT CONSTRAINT MAY BE FINDING THE LAUNCHER, NOT STRIKING IT

Right-of-launch defence begins once a missile or drone is airborne: detect, classify, track and, where necessary, engage it. Left-of-launch or counterforce seeks to reduce the number of weapons that ever enter that defensive sequence by disrupting launch systems, launch-ready weapons, storage, surveillance, command-and-control and enabling infrastructure. The distinction is strategic, not a recommendation for any specific strike.

Historical CENTCOM reporting demonstrates that mobile Houthi launch systems can sometimes be found and destroyed. On 21 February 2024, CENTCOM reported strikes on seven mobile anti-ship cruise missiles and one mobile anti-ship ballistic-missile launcher prepared to launch; other 2024 releases recorded additional missile and UAV launchers destroyed. [23][24] Saudi coalition reporting on 20 October 2026 likewise states that the ballistic-missile launcher used in that day's Riyadh attack was destroyed. [4] These cases establish feasibility. They do not establish a durable solution.

Mobile launchers can relocate, disperse, conceal, exploit terrain and civilian infrastructure, expose themselves only briefly, use decoys, and draw on distributed storage and assembly networks. The central constraint on counterforce may therefore be persistent target identification and confidence rather than the availability of strike platforms. The more fleeting the launch window, the more important persistent ISR, launch warning, sensor fusion and rapid decision cycles become. This assessment excludes launch coordinates, battery locations, target-development procedures and other exploitable targeting detail.

Counterforce also has an empirical limit. US, UK and regional strikes have destroyed Houthi launchers, missiles, UAV systems, radar and storage over multiple campaigns, yet Houthi long-range strike capability persisted and adapted. The evidence therefore supports a narrower judgement: counterforce can reduce launch tempo, destroy scarce systems and increase the cost of attack, but is unlikely to eliminate the strike architecture without sustained intelligence, repeated pressure and disruption of regeneration and supply.

FORWARD JUDGEMENT - 2 TO 6 WEEKS

If Houthi attacks continue to alternate between Riyadh, aviation nodes, southern cities, western energy/logistics infrastructure and the Eastern Region, Saudi defensive behaviour is likely to become more explicitly tiered. Priority strategic nodes will receive deeper layered protection; fighters and lower-cost counter-UAS will be used where they can conserve high-end interceptors; allied sensors/personnel will be integrated selectively; and counterforce/ISR activity will increase in an effort to reduce the number of weapons reaching the engagement phase. This trajectory would be weakened by a sustained fall in attack tempo and geographic diversity, a diplomatic pause, or evidence that the current campaign is reverting to a narrow southern-border pattern.

Commercial and Operational Consequences

The decision-relevant consequence is not that Saudi Arabia is becoming uniformly unsafe. It is that country-level risk is becoming less useful than node-level risk. An organisation in Riyadh, Dhahran, Yanbu, Dammam, Abha or Najran can face materially different threat classes, defensive postures and disruption mechanisms even when the national economy and most infrastructure continue to function.

EXPOSED USER	DECISION RELEVANCE
Energy operators	Different facilities may receive different defensive depth; contingency costs, contractor exposure and insurance assumptions can rise even without sustained production loss. Yanbu remains important as Red Sea export redundancy while remaining inside the wider threat geography.
Aviation	Airport attacks, air-defence activity, falling debris, short-notice airspace measures and aircraft-on-ground exposure create risk even when missiles are intercepted. EASA already requires close monitoring and contingency planning. [1]
Logistics / infrastructure	Ports, airports, roads, industrial nodes and accommodation can experience short disruption, access controls or security costs without national-system failure. Resilience assumptions should be site-specific.
Insurers / risk markets	Successful defence does not equal absence of loss. Wider geographic exposure raises accumulation questions across aviation, energy, property and business interruption.
Contractors / multinational employers	Personnel location, accommodation, travel patterns, shelter/alerting, communications and business-continuity dependencies should be tested at site level rather than treated as one Saudi risk category.
Defence industry	Sustained demand is likely for high-end interceptors, cheaper counter-UAS, sensors, radar, C2 integration, EW, ISR, hardening and passive-defence measures.

Second- and third-order effects

- Distributed attacks -> more defended locations -> interceptor/personnel dispersion -> explicit prioritisation -> residual exposure at lower-priority sites.
- Successful interception -> debris or temporary disruption -> aviation/civilian effects -> insurance, security and business-continuity cost despite failed attack.
- Sustained defensive burden -> accelerated Saudi procurement -> deeper allied integration -> increased demand for intelligence-sharing, sensors and lower-cost engagement layers.
- Persistent mobile-launch capability -> stronger pressure for ISR/counterforce -> recurring contest between launcher loss and Houthi regeneration/adaptation.
- Repeated deep attacks -> more differentiated investment and insurance perceptions between Saudi locations, rather than a single national risk judgement.

Competing Hypotheses

These hypotheses are not mechanically scored. The test is which explanation remains most consistent with the evidence and what observable developments would distinguish it.

HYPOTHESIS	EVIDENCE CONSISTENCY	CURRENT READING	DISTINGUISHING INDICATORS
H1 - Defensive capacity remains sufficient	**PARTLY SUPPORTED**	Saudi layered defence and reinforcements continue to defeat many threats and most strategic systems remain functioning. Repeated airport effects and widening geography prevent treating this as comprehensive protection.	Sustained high interception rate; limited repeat damage; normal airport/energy operations; no evidence of magazine/readiness stress.
H2 - Geographic saturation	**STRONGEST CURRENT CONSISTENCY**	EASA independently identifies widening geography; October incidents span Riyadh, Eastern Region, western/southern nodes and civil aviation. The mechanism does not require every attack to succeed.	More geographically distinct target areas; repeated shifts between regions; visible defensive prioritisation or deployments.
H3 - Magazine / economic pressure	**PLAUSIBLE, NOT YET PROVEN**	Large Saudi PAC-3 request and global production acceleration show strategic demand, but public evidence does not show Saudi Arabia is currently running short.	Resupply acceleration; engagement rationing; new interceptor purchases; visible substitution toward cheaper layers; readiness constraints.
H4 - Counterforce reduces attack rate	**POSSIBLE / UNPROVEN**	Launcher destruction is demonstrably possible, including Saudi claims on 20 October. Subsequent UAV attacks on 21 October show no immediate campaign-wide suppression.	Sustained reduction in launches following verified launcher/storage losses; longer intervals; loss of specific threat profiles.
H5 - Houthi adaptation offsets counterforce	**HISTORICALLY CONSISTENT**	Past launcher/system losses did not eliminate long-range capability, consistent with mobility, concealment and regeneration. The current regeneration rate is not publicly measurable.	Rapid resumption after strikes; new launcher/weapon losses without durable tempo reduction; persistent mixed threat profiles.

What would disprove the central assessment?

- A sustained reduction in the number of geographically distinct Saudi target areas despite continuing high attack tempo.
- Evidence that Saudi/allied layered defence can add defended-area coverage and magazine depth faster than the target set expands, with no meaningful residual disruption.
- A durable diplomatic pause or operational collapse in Houthi long-range launch capability.
- Verified counterforce producing a sustained, multi-week reduction in launch tempo that does not rapidly regenerate.
- A return to a predominantly southern-border threat pattern with deep Saudi targets no longer repeatedly attempted.

Indicators & Warnings - what to monitor next

ATTACK PATTERN

- Launch frequency and salvo size.
- Number of geographically distinct target areas.
- Ballistic / cruise / UAV mix.
- Repeat attacks against already defended airports, cities or energy nodes.
- Debris casualties and damage after successful interceptions.

DEFENSIVE RESPONSE

- New Saudi/allied air-defence deployments.
- PAC-3 / THAAD procurement, resupply or readiness signals.
- Lower-cost counter-UAS deployments and fighter defensive patrols.
- Sensor/C2 integration or new intelligence-sharing arrangements.
- Airport/airspace contingency measures and revised aviation guidance.

LEFT OF LAUNCH

- Verified launcher or storage losses.
- Evidence of pre-launch detection and subsequent change in attack tempo.
- Whether launcher destruction produces sustained suppression or only short pauses.
- Evidence of Houthi regeneration, replacement systems or changed launch profiles.
- Shift in Saudi/Yemeni counterforce intensity without corresponding threat reduction.

Outlook

Near term - days to two weeks: the highest-confidence expectation is continued mixed-threat interception activity rather than a clean transition to either Saudi defensive failure or Houthi suppression. Riyadh, aviation nodes and geographically separated regions are likely to remain relevant targets because distribution itself creates burden. Allied contributions should improve capacity at selected layers, but the public evidence base is not sufficient to assume uniform additional coverage nationwide.

Short term - two to six weeks: if the attack pattern remains distributed, Saudi and partner activity is likely to become more visibly differentiated by threat class. Fighters, electronic warfare and cheaper counter-UAS can help preserve high-end interceptors for ballistic/cruise threats; THAAD/Patriot remain concentrated on higher-value ballistic-missile defence; and ISR/counterforce receives greater emphasis as the only way to reduce the volume that must be engaged after launch. This is a strategic trajectory, not a recommendation for offensive action.

Commercially, the key change is the loss of a simple national-risk frame. The relevant question for operators is increasingly which node, which threat class, which defensive layer and which dependencies are involved. An airport can resume operations while remaining exposed to repeat attack; an energy system can maintain national throughput while individual facilities face intermittent disruption; and a successful interception can still generate loss and delay.

BOTTOM LINE

Saudi Arabia's air-defence problem is becoming a geography problem because the attacker can impose burden by widening the set of places that require protection. The Kingdom and its allies can improve interception, add layers and protect priority assets, but they cannot make geography disappear. If the current pattern persists, the decisive competition will be between Houthi ability to keep regenerating geographically distributed launch options and Saudi/allied ability to combine layered defence with enough ISR and counterforce to reduce the rate at which those weapons reach the engagement phase.

Methodology, Boundaries & Source Appendix

Methodology and editorial safeguards

Methodology: This assessment draws on Saudi official reporting, EASA, UK and US defence sources, partner-government statements and major international reporting. Technical and deployment claims are traced to originating sources where possible, and confirmed events are separated from attributed reporting and Optarus assessment. Collection closed at 10:46 BST on 22 October 2026.

Assessment boundary: this report does not provide navigation advice, targeting guidance, precise air-defence battery locations, suspected Houthi launcher coordinates, strike recommendations or operational procedures. Counterforce is assessed only as a strategic mechanism and is not presented as a guaranteed or exclusive solution. Political statements of allied support are distinguished from confirmed deployed capability. Interceptor-cost comparisons are contextual rather than one-for-one engagement claims.

AI transparency: Optarus uses AI-assisted tools to support source retrieval, comparison and drafting. Analytical judgements and attribution decisions remain subject to analyst review against cited open sources. AI assistance does not replace source verification or analyst accountability.

Source Appendix

[1] EASA, CZIB-2026-09-R1, Airspace of Saudi Arabia, issued 30 Sep; revised 9 Oct 2026 - wider Houthi attack geography, Riyadh/Tabuk/Medina/Yanbu exposure, aviation/interception/debris risk.
[2] Saudi Press Agency / General Directorate of Civil Defense, 14 Oct 2026 - debris from two intercepted cruise missiles in Riyadh injured four and damaged 15 homes; separate ballistic-interception debris caused additional injury/property damage.
[3] Saudi Press Agency / Coalition, 20 Oct 2026 - ballistic missile launched toward Riyadh intercepted and destroyed.
[4] Saudi Press Agency / Coalition, 20 Oct 2026 - coalition states launcher used in that day's Riyadh ballistic-missile attack was destroyed.
[5] Saudi Press Agency / Coalition and Arab News, 21 Oct 2026 - seven UAV interceptions reported across Madinah, Eastern and southern regions.
[6] Saudi Press Agency / Civil Defense, 18 Oct 2026 - Houthi projectile impact in Najran injured six; residential/vehicle damage.
[7] GACA / Saudi Press Agency, 7-11 Oct 2026 - attacks and operational impacts involving King Khalid International Airport and Abha International Airport.
[8] GACA / Saudi Press Agency, 11 Oct 2026 - King Fahd International Airport targeted; inspections/damage assessment.
[9] Saudi Energy Ministry / Reuters, 13-14 Oct 2026 - attack on Saudi Aramco headquarters in Dhahran; limited fire reported officially; operations continued.
[10] Saudi Press Agency / Coalition, 26 Sep and 8-18 Oct 2026 - repeated ballistic/UAV interceptions involving Riyadh and Khamis Mushait.
[11] Saudi Press Agency / GCC reporting, 19-24 Sep 2026 - attempted/confirmed launched-toward threats involving Taif and Yanbu.
[12] Saudi Press Agency, 12 Mar 2026 - drone intercepted while heading toward Shaybah field; retained as 2026 evidence of deep energy-target reach.
[13] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 30 Jan 2026 - proposed Saudi FMS request for 730 PAC-3 MSE missiles and related support, estimated US$9bn.
[14] US Army FY2026 Missile Procurement Justification Book - PAC-3 MSE gross/weapon-system unit cost about US$4.600m; used as procurement-scale context, not Saudi engagement cost.
[15] US Army, 10 Apr 2026 - US$4.7bn contract action supporting accelerated PAC-3 MSE production.
[16] Lockheed Martin / US government, Jan and Jul 2026 - framework/multiyear actions intended to increase PAC-3 MSE annual capacity from about 600 to 2,000 over seven years.
[17] Missile Defense Agency / Lockheed Martin, 2025-26 - THAAD deliveries to Saudi Arabia; manufacturer currently lists one active KSA battery.
[18] UK Ministry of Defence, 20 Oct 2026 - RAF Typhoon defensive counter-air missions, A400M logistics support, advisers, existing air-defence equipment and refuelling support.
[19] UK Ministry of Defence / Royal Air Force, 2026 - Typhoon weapons/sensor and lower-cost APKWS counter-UAS integration context.
[20] Reuters / Pakistan military statement, 8 Oct 2026 - Pakistani forces deployed in Saudi Arabia in multiple capabilities/domains under Makkah pact; public detail limited.
[21] Reuters, 20-21 Oct 2026 - Turkey submits pact for ratification; prospective personnel mandate; initial support described around equipment, intelligence, weapons systems, air defence and EW.
[22] Reuters / Egyptian Presidency, 21 Oct 2026 - Egyptian role, if authorised, described as defence of Saudi territory/borders rather than attacks on Yemen; parliamentary process pending.
[23] US CENTCOM, 22 Feb 2024 - seven mobile Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles and one mobile anti-ship ballistic-missile launcher reported destroyed before launch.
[24] US CENTCOM, multiple 2024 releases - additional Houthi missile/UAV launchers and launch-ready systems reported destroyed; used as historical evidence of counterforce feasibility and limits.

Acronyms & Terms

TERM	PLAIN-ENGLISH DEFINITION
BMD	Ballistic-missile defence.
C2	Command and control.
CZIB	EASA Conflict Zone Information Bulletin.
EASA	European Union Aviation Safety Agency.
EW	Electronic warfare.
IAMD	Integrated air and missile defence.
ISR	Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
PAC-3 MSE	Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement.
THAAD	Terminal High Altitude Area Defense.
UAS / UAV	Uncrewed aircraft system / uncrewed aerial vehicle.